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A. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
The “Petersberg tasks”1 were initially adopted by the Western European Union 
(WEU) in June 1992. The WEU Council of Ministers declared that, in addition to the 
continuing collective defense obligations of the WEU member states under the 1948 
Brussels Treaty and the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, “military units of WEU member 
States, acting under the authority of WEU, could be employed for: humanitarian and 
rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; [and] tasks of combat forces in crisis management, 
including peacemaking.”2 The Petersberg tasks were adopted as the military missions of 
the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the 1997 
Amsterdam Treaty and the 2000 Nice Treaty. However, the member states of the 
European Union (EU) have for years, particularly since the terrorist attacks on the United 
States in September 2001, been considering a redefinition of those missions. 
On 18 July 2003, the European Convention published the final version of the draft 
treaty establishing a Constitution for the European Union. This draft treaty recommended 
that the missions in which the European Union could use its civilian and military means 
be expanded to include the following:  
• conflict prevention,  
• joint disarmament operations, 
• military advice and assistance, 
• post-conflict stabilization, and  
• support to third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.3  
With the European Convention’s recommendation, two critical questions have 
emerged: To what extent can the operations in the updated Petersberg tasks be defined 
with greater precision? What capabilities requirements have to be met to conduct these 
                                                 
1 The tasks were named after the location outside Bonn, Germany, where the WEU Council of 
Ministers made the declaration. 
2 Western European Union (WEU), Council of Ministers, Petersberg Declaration, Bonn, 19 June 
1992, Ch. II, Par. 4, 6, Available at [http://www.weu.int], Accessed 10 December 2003.  
3 The European Convention, Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, CONV 850/03, 
Brussels, 18 July 2003, Title V, Chap. II, Sec. I, Art. III-210, 162, Available at  [http://european-
convention.eu.int/docs/Treaty/cv00850.en03.pdf], Accessed 10 January 2004. 
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operations? These questions are addressed in this thesis. With the updated Petersberg 
tasks proposal the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has received a new 
dynamic with several implications at the global level. However, the most important issue 
is whether the European Union’s effort to acquire credible tools capable of intervening 
effectively in international security affairs has gone one step further. Therefore, the 
purpose of this thesis is to examine to what extent that step is of practical value. The 
analysis concentrates on the European Union’s actual and prospective capabilities to meet 
the requirements of the updated Petersberg tasks.  
B. IMPORTANCE  
The ESDP project has been a thorny issue in the trans-Atlantic arena since its 
beginning in late 1998. However, the European Union’s critical military shortfalls have 
hampered its development. The European Convention’s recommendation constitutes 
another step in the developmental process of the ESDP, and a new chapter in the long-
standing debate. If the EU has the political will and the operational capabilities to 
undertake the “updated Petersberg Tasks,” it may gain a more influential position in 
international politics since it could play a larger role in relation to international 
organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the United Nations (UN). 
Therefore, potential ESDP developments in light of the Convention’s recommendation 
regarding updated Petersberg tasks should be carefully considered by specialists in 
international security affairs, particularly strategic planners.  
C. MAJOR QUESTIONS ΑΝD ARGUMENT 
The proposed updated list of the Petersberg tasks has given birth to some 
uncertainties, since the European Convention’s proposal does not specifically define what 
should be expected from each mission. For example, what is meant by conflict 
prevention? Is the European Union’s definition the same as that of the United Nations? If 
not, how does it differ? Moreover, will the missions included in the updated list be 
carried out by the same forces identified in 1999 as the “Headline Goal?” Or will 
additional or different forces be required? Furthermore, what form should the support to a 
third country, in case of a terrorist attack, take? The thesis attempts to resolve some of 
these uncertainties by employing the methodology described below. 
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As noted earlier, the thesis focuses on the following research question: Is the 
European Union capable of performing the updated Petersberg tasks that have been 
recommended by the European Convention? This question is answered by examining the 
following closely related questions: 
• What are the origins of the ESDP concept? What significant steps led to 
the European Convention’s recommendation? 
• What is the precise definition of the “updated missions” and what 
requirements have to be met to successfully accomplish them? 
• What is the European Union’s current military posture, and what are its 
future prospects? What improvements must be made to perform the 
“updated Petersberg tasks”? 
• What is the importance of the European Convention’s recommendation?  
The thesis concludes that the European Union is currently capable of undertaking 
the missions that require mostly civilian tools or medium-level military forces for their 
conduct. The European Union does not at present have the relevant capabilities for the 
missions that demand more advanced military forces. 
D. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
The thesis primarily employs a comparative approach. In particular, it examines 
past activities similar to those included in the updated list of Petersberg tasks and 
compares the capabilities required with those of the European Union. The time 
framework for this comparative study focuses on the post-Cold War era for the civilian or 
military undertakings and the period since the Saint Malo meeting for the assessment of 
the European Union’s military capabilities. This method is expected to lead to reasonably 
accurate conclusions since it is based on the examination of concrete technical 
requirements in a similar political framework.  
Since the European Convention made its recommendation regarding an updated 
list of Petersberg Tasks in July 2003, the quantity of relevant primary sources is 
comparatively limited. However, UN documents on peace operations, EU and NATO 
documents concerning the ESDP, statements by national leaders and other officials, 
agreements and treaties, and the literature dedicated to European defence affairs and 
peace operations provide valuable material for analysis. In addition, official defence  
3 
ministries’ publications and unofficial studies of military forces help identify the 
capabilities of the ESDP contributors. The secondary sources include informational 
reports and analytical studies. 
E. CHAPTER-BY-CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II reviews the historical background of 
the ESDP developmental process and especially the factors that have contributed to its 
progress. The examination of events follows a chronological order. It commences with 
the Maastricht Treaty and the first steps of the European Union’s Common Foreign and 
Security Policy and provides a brief account of the successive European Councils and 
related events affecting the evolution of its security and defense aspect.  
Chapter III explores the meaning of the updated missions and attempts to identify 
their capabilities requirements. In doing so, it considers how other organizations have 
defined and conducted such missions, including the personnel and equipment 
requirements. 
Chapter IV examines the overall operational capabilities of the European Union’s 
civilian agencies and military forces with special attention to the proposed missions. It 
briefly discusses the evident lack of commitment by the EU countries to meeting the 
requirements of the original Petersberg tasks. It then compares the requirements of the 
newly proposed missions to the actual operational capabilities of the European Union’s 
forces, furnishing a basis for conclusions about the extent to which proposed missions 
could be carried out. It also reviews the efforts the EU member states have undertaken to 
address their recognized shortfalls.  
Chapter V summarizes the thesis findings and focuses on the importance of the 
European Union’s ability to carry out the updated Petersberg tasks. 
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The “updated Petersberg tasks” represent only one of the latest steps in the 
developmental process of the ESDP. Diverse considerations about the future role of the 
European Union, trans-Atlantic debates, financial constraints, political alliances, 
operational concerns, and the intervention of the great powers are only some of the 
factors, which have thus far influenced the ESDP’s progress. The decision-making 
procedure of ESDP development has not always run smoothly. The outcomes were 
mainly the product of compromises among the EU member states, which many times 
found themselves in a difficult position. Consequently, a close look at that process would 
be helpful to identify its critical points and extract lessons to ascertain what was done 
well and what went wrong. 
Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to examine the evolution of the ESDP, 
mainly from a historical point of view, clarifying the necessary political assumptions 
whenever possible. In doing so, the analysis follows a chronological order. The first 
section deals with the actual events that took place in the European security arena, 
primarily in the last decade of the 20th century. The second analyzes two of the primary 
factors in the context of the Union’s gradual maturation and attempts to determine where 
the ESDP efforts are more likely to succeed.  
B. A DECADE OF RAPID PACE 
Since 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been the major 
political-military force in Western Europe. In contrast, the European Community (EC), 
initially developed as an economic association, only began to take an interest in external 
security affairs in 1970, with the policy consultation mechanism known as European 
Political Cooperation. Not until the Maastricht Treaty entered into force in November 
1993, did the EC member states give a new character to their organization with the 
creation of the European Union (EU). The Maastricht Treaty, also known as the Treaty 
on European Union (TEU), set the objective of a Common Foreign and Security Policy  
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(CFSP) as the necessary step for the European Union to make its voice heard on the 
global stage4 and referred to the development of the Western European Union (WEU) as 
its defense arm.5  
The provisions concerning the CFSP were revised by the Amsterdam Treaty, 
which entered into force in May 1999 and also gave birth to the European Security and 
Defense Policy (ESDP). The ESDP, as an integral part of the CFSP, covers all matters 
relating to the Union’s security, including the eventual formulation of a common defense 
if the European Council so decides. That development embodied the EU members’ 
aspirations to promote their security and defense activities in a common policy in 
cooperation with NATO and not within it.6 In addition, the European Council decided to 
establish the position of the Secretary General of the Council and High Representative for 
the CFSP (SG/HR) for coordinating the Union’s efforts and effectively promoting the 
Council’s decisions regarding international security affairs.7 Finally, the “Petersberg 
tasks” were placed at the core of the ESDP process. 
However, the vital impetus for the creation of the ESDP had been given six 
months earlier at the St. Malo meeting on 4 December 1998 between the leaders of 
Britain and France. The St. Malo declaration resulted from a significant shift in British 
foreign policy concerning the European Union’s defense affairs. Britain reversed its long-
standing position of opposing EU involvement in military security affairs and became a 
leading proponent of European integration through ESDP by agreeing that “the Union 
must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the 
means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international 
                                                 
4 European Union, Activities of the European Union-Foreign and Security Policy, Available at 
[http://europa.eu.int/pol/cfsp/overview_en.htm], Accessed 10 November 2003.   
5 Treaty on European Union, Maastricht, 7 February 1992, Provisions on a Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, Title V, Article J.4, Par. 2, Available at [http://europa.eu.int/en/record/mt/title5.html], 
Accessed 16 November 2003. 
6 The different perceptions in the EU and NATO on what form a common European security and 
defense policy should take were reflected on the different terms that those organizations used to address it. 
In NATO, it was called ESDI and in the EU it was called ESDP. In particular, the “I” for NATO stood for 
“Identity,” which should be developed within the Alliance. By contrast, “P” for the EU, stood for “Policy,” 
which should be developed within the EU, in cooperation with NATO. 
7 Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the 
European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Amsterdam, 2 October 1997, Provisions on a Common 
Foreign and Security Policy, Part One, Article 1, Title V, Article J.16, 15, Available at 
[http://www.europarl.eu.int/topics/treaty/pdf/amst-en.pdf], Accessed 16 November 2003. 
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crises.”8 The St. Malo declaration was so well received by the rest of the EU member 
states that all of them, with the exception of Denmark,9 decided to embark on the ESDP 
project. Moreover, at the Cologne European Council meeting on 3 and 4 June 1999, the 
governments of the European Union expressed the intention “to give the European Union 
the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common 
European policy on security and defence…in order to respond to international crises 
without prejudice to actions by NATO.”10  
Afterwards, the Helsinki European Council on 10 and 11 December 1999 
sketched the operational framework for the European Union’s potential interventions in 
international crises. In specific terms, the EU leaders concluded that: 
cooperating voluntarily in EU-led operations, Member States must be 
able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year 
military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of 
Petersberg Tasks;  
new political and military bodies and structures will be established within 
the Council to enable the Union to ensure the necessary political guidance 
and strategic direction to such operations, while respecting the single 
institutional framework; 
modalities will be developed for full consultation, cooperation and 
transparency between the EU and NATO, taking into account the needs of 
all EU Member States; 
appropriate arrangements will be defined that would allow, while 
respecting the Union’s decision-making autonomy, non-EU European 
NATO members and other interested states to contribute to EU military 
crisis management; 
 
                                                 
8 Joint Declaration, British-French Summit, St Malo, 3-4 December 1998, par. 2, in Maartje Rutten, 
ed., From St. Malo to Nice: European Defence Core Documents, Chaillot Paper 47, (Paris: Institute for 
Security Studies-Western European Union, May 2001), 8, Available at [http://www.iss-
eu.org/chaillot/chai47e.pdf], Accessed 5 August 2003. 
9 According to the Protocol 5 annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty, “Denmark does not participate in the 
elaboration and the implementation of decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications, 
but it will not prevent the development of closer cooperation between Member States in this area.” For 
more details in the Treaty of Amsterdam, Protocol on the Position of Denmark, Part II, Article 6, 102, 
Available at [http://www.europarl.eu.int/topics/treaty/pdf/amst-en.pdf], Accessed 16 November 2003. 
10 Declaration of the European Council on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security 
and Defence, par. 1, Cologne, 3-4 June 1999 in Rutten, Chaillot Paper 47, 41.  
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a non-military crisis management mechanism will be established to 
coordinate and make more effective the various civilian means and 
resources, in parallel with the military ones, at the disposal of the Union 
and the Member States.11 
Taking advantage of the momentum gained at Helsinki, the General Affairs 
Council met in Brussels, on 14-15 February 2000, and proceeded to make decisions 
regarding the establishment of the following three interim bodies responsible for handling 
all ESDP issues: 
The interim Political and Security Committee (PSC)…will be composed 
of national representatives at the senior/ambassador level, placed within 
the framework of Member States’ Permanent Representations. Its task, in 
close cooperation with the Secretary General/High Representative, will be 
to prepare recommendations on the future functioning of the CESDP and 
to deal with CFSP affairs on a day to day basis. 
The interim Military Body [later known as the EU Military Committee] 
will be composed of representatives of the Member States’ Chief[s] of 
Defence [Staff] and will have to give military advice as required to the 
Political and Security Committee and to the Secretary General/High 
Representative. It is assisted by the military experts seconded from 
Member States to the Council Secretariat. 
The national military experts [later known as the EU Military Staff] on 
secondment will be part of the General Secretariat of the Council. They 
will provide military expertise to the interim Military body and the SG/HR 
to support CFSP.12 
Subsequently, the Nice European Council, on 7, 8 and 9 December 2000, 
recognizing those bodies’ significant contribution to the Union’s policy and military 
planning, gave them a permanent character by approving their official adoption. 
In between these events, the Feira European Council on 19 and 20 June 2000 
proceeded to define the necessary arrangements that would allow the non-EU European 
NATO members and the candidate countries for accession to the EU to participate in EU-
led military crisis management. Furthermore, the last WEU Ministerial Council, which 
was held in Marseille on 13 November 2000, marked the official end of the WEU’s 
r transfer to the European Union. However, the WEU was operational functions and thei                                                 
11 European Council Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki, par. 28, 10-11 December 1999 in Rutten, 
Chaillot Paper 47, 82. 
12 General Affairs Council, Brussels, 14-15 February 2000, Strengthening of European Security and 
Defence Policy, in Rutten, Chaillot Paper 47, 93. 
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not entirely abolished. Since 1 July 2001, it has obtained a new restructured mode and its 
residual functions have mainly related to (a) safeguarding the mutual defense 
commitment of the modified Brussels Treaty; (b) providing administrative, financial and 
linguistic support to the organization’s armaments bodies, the Western European 
Armaments Group (WEAG) and Western European Armaments Organization (WEAO); 
(c) reorganizing and opening the archives to the public; and (d) the management of 
pensions.13  
Subsequently, the Laeken European Council (14-15 December 2001), taking into 
account the progress that had been made at that time, declared that 
[T]hrough the continuing development of the ESDP, the strengthening of 
its capabilities, both civil and military, and the creation of appropriate 
structures within it … the Union is now capable of conducting some crisis-
management operations… Development of the means and capabilities at 
its disposal will enable the Union progressively to take on more 
demanding operations.14   
However, it was only after another year that the European Union managed to 
complete its negotiations with NATO and open the door for the undertaking of its first 
operations. The Copenhagen European Council on 12-13 December 2002 approved the 
necessary accommodations that would allow the Union to have access to NATO’s 
infrastructure for operations in which the Alliance does not wish to be more directly 
involved.15 In addition, the ensuing EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP, published on 16  
                                                 
13 WEU, What is WEU Today? Available at [http://www.weu.int/WEU_today.htm], Accessed 10 
October 2003. 
14 European Council, Laeken, 14 -15 December 2001, Presidency Conclusions, in Maartje Rutten, ed., 
From Nice to Laeken: European Defense Core Documents, Chaillot Paper 51 (Paris: Institute for Security 
Studies-European Union, April 2002), Par. 6, 110, Available at [http://www.iss-
eu.org/chaillot/chai51e.pdf], Accessed 10 October 2003. 
15 European Council, Copenhagen, 12-13 December 2002, Presidency Conclusions, in Jean Yves 
Haine, ed., From Laeken to Copenhagen: European Defence Core Documents, Chaillot Paper 57 (Paris: 
Institute for Security Studies-European Union, February 2003), 165, Available at [http://www.iss-
eu.org/chaillot/chai57e.pdf], Accessed 20 October 2003.  
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December 2002, finalized the strategic partnership between the two organizations by 
authorizing the implementation of the “Berlin-plus”16 agreement and “ensuring the fullest 
possible involvement of non-EU European members of NATO within ESDP.”17    
Since that declaration, the European Union launched its first policing mission on 
1 January 2003 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, succeeding the United Nations in that role. From 
31 March to 15 December 2003 it conducted its first military operation, succeeding 
NATO’s “Allied Harmony” in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), 
and from 12 June to 1 September 2003, its second one, which was an effort to stabilize 
the security conditions and improve the humanitarian situation in Bunia, in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Operation Concordia in FYROM and Operation 
Artemis in DRC involved approximately 350 and 1,800 EU troops, respectively.18 
Finally, on 15 December 2003 the European Union launched its second policing mission, 
this time in FYROM, to help the country’s police forces fight organized crime and 
develop to international standards. 
Despite the significant progress of the European Union’s transformation efforts, 
the member states have realized that additional measures need to come into practice, 
especially with regard to the modernization of EU institutions and the establishment of a 
more effective mechanism to speak to the world with a single voice. To that end, the 
European Convention was created with the mission to propose new ideas and introduce 
fresh approaches for the future of the European Union. 
On 18 July 2003, in Rome, the Chairman of the European Convention, Valéry 
Giscard d’Estaing, handed over the full draft treaty intended to serve as a Constitution for 
the European Union to the President of the European Council, Italian Prime Minister 
Silvio Berlusconi. That constitution is expected to replace all existing EU treaties and 
crucially influence the European Union’s development in the coming decades. 
                                                 
16 The first decision allowing the EU to have access to NATO assets was reached at the Berlin 
Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 3 June 1996. A more detailed agreement was reached 
at the 1999 NATO Washington Summit, which gained the “Berlin-Plus” title. That agreement, however, 
initiated a series of negotiations among the NATO allies and the EU member states; and these negotiations 
were completed in December 2002.  
17 EU- NATO, Brussels, 16 December 2002, European Union-NATO Declaration on ESDP, in Haine, 
Chaillot Paper 57, 179. 
18 Dov Lynch and Antonio Misiroli, ESDP Operations (Paris: Institute for Security Studies-European 
Union), 3, Available at [http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/09-dvl-am.pdf], Accessed 10 April 2004.  
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Consequently, it has already become the object of extensive discussions among EU 
member states in the Intergovernmental Conference context. It is hoped that these 
discussions will be concluded before the European Parliament’s elections in June 2004.   
The European Union’s aspirations to exert influence on world affairs and acquire 
international credibility contributed to the creation of the ESDP. “The aim in framing that 
policy is not to transform the European Union into a military alliance but to provide it 
with the instruments it needs to defend its objectives and its values.”19 Remarkably, 
though, that process took approximately a decade to gestate and become a reality. One 
may date its beginning from the drafting of the CFSP provisions of the Maastricht Treaty 
in 1991, and its first concrete results were the operations undertaken in 2003. Therefore, 
it is important to analyze the fundamental reasons behind the progress achieved. 
C. THE DRIVING FACTORS 
West European efforts to create a common security and defense policy have a 
complex history in the post-World War II period. The 1947 Treaty of Dunkirk between 
Britain and France, and the 1948 Brussels Treaty among Britain, Belgium, France, 
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands are considered the first post-1945 attempts to organize 
a unified West European defense posture.20 However, the failed attempt to set up the 
European Defense Community (EDC) in 1950-1954 postponed the pursuit of further 
ambitions of that nature. After the EDC’s failure, the Western European Union (WEU) 
was established on the basis of the 1954 Brussels Treaty. In the event, the strong United 
States commitment to European security through NATO rendered the operational 
importance of the WEU almost irrelevant. It took until the 1990s for the European Union 
to see the dreams of some of its founding fathers come true. Apart from the completely 
different international conditions, there were two major factors in these recent successes. 
The first major factor concerns the United Kingdom’s attitude towards European 
security and defense arrangements. As the most powerful member state of the European 
Union in military terms, Britain plays a decisive role influencing all potential 
developments. France and Germany cannot effectively push things forward in this 
                                                 
19 The European Convention-Working Group VIII, Final Report of Working Group VIII-Defense, 
CONV 461/02, 16 December 2002, Par. 50, 15, Available at [http://register-
consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/02/cv00/00461en2.pdf], Accessed 10 March 2003.  
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domain without Britain. France’s usual anti-American rhetoric makes other countries 
suspect that Paris might have ulterior motives. Germany has had difficulties with carrying 
out its defense reforms21 and does not seem capable of undertaking another significant 
project. The most characteristic expression of the United Kingdom’s key role was, as 
already noted, the St. Malo declaration, which provided new impetus to the entire ESDP 
project. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the staunchest United States ally, British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair, accepted the draft Constitution’s provision for a “‘structured co-
operation within the Union framework,’ and that means outside NATO.”22 This proposal, 
already backed by France and Germany, worried the Americans and ignited a new debate 
among trans-Atlantic circles.  
British support for the ESDP serves four purposes. First, it gives Britain a more 
pro-European Union profile “to compensate for the United Kingdom’s self-chosen 
exclusion from other European projects, most notably the European Monetary Union 
(EMU),”23 or to regain the support of the British people who favored “Old Europe’s”24 
position and opposed the recent war in Iraq. Second, it gives Britain an opportunity to 
play a leading role in European affairs. The United Kingdom, “which is the highest 
European spender on defense and fields Europe’s most capable armed forces that are well 
suited to far-flung international deployments,”25 cannot simply ignore its historic destiny 
and not get involved in EU military affairs. Third, the British participation augments 
multipolarity among European Union member states and allows the representation of 
                                                 
21 François Heisbourg et al., European Defence: Making it Work, Chaillot Paper 42 (Paris: Institute 
for Security Studies-Western European Union, September 2000), 9, Available at [http://www.iss-
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22 Paul Reynolds, “Defence: Atlantic or European?”, BBC News-Europe, Available at 
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for Security Studies, April 2000), 4-5. 
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divergent approaches within the EU. That, in turn, would lead to the easing of potential 
tensions and facilitate the decision-making process. Finally, Britain’s leadership role in 
the ESDP makes the likelihood of an anti-American position remote, and therefore 
reassures US policy-makers.26  
As for the second major factor, some governments have demonstrated an 
increased sensitivity since the end of the Cold War to incidents of human rights 
violations, especially by repressive regimes against their own populations. Many states 
argued that respect for a state’s sovereignty, which has nominally been a significant pillar 
of international order since the seventeenth century, can no longer justify inaction in the 
face of genocide.27 The decisive reaction of some states in those cases gave birth to a new 
type of intervention, one based on humanitarian grounds, which may become more 
prominent in the 21st century. 
Examples of humanitarian intervention operations in the early 1990s include the 
following: the intervention by the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) in Liberia’s civil war in August 1990; the evacuation of 716 nationals by 
Belgian and French troops in Kinshasa, Zaire, in October 1991; and Operation Provide 
Comfort in northern Iraq in April 1991. These operations, whether authorized by an 
explicit UN Security Council mandate or not, were considered legitimate actions by the 
overwhelming majority of governments.28 
The undertaking of these missions seemed to influence the formulation of the 
WEU’s military tasks, also known as the Petersberg tasks, in 1992.29 Its humanitarian 
and rescue missions referred to operations such as the aforementioned ones in Zaire and 
northern Iraq, and the peacekeeping tasks to the usual UN missions, which have been 
conducted for a long time. The last category, as Willem van Eekelen stated, consisted of 
“coercive measures.”  
 
                                                 
26 Ibid. 
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Security Studies-Western European Union, March 2001), v, Available at [http://www.iss-
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28 Ibid., 105. 
29 Ibid. 
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The inclusion of the word “peacemaking” was interpreted as peace-
enforcement, in line with the jargon used at the time. It was used because 
Germany found it difficult to accept an earlier version: “tasks of combat 
forces in crisis management, limited armed conflict and armed conflict.”30   
An additional incentive, however, was provided by the embarrassing situation in 
which the EU member states found themselves during the Bosnian crisis in 1992-1995. 
That is, the EU lacked the military means to intervene effectively in this conflict. The 
NATO European armed forces’ limited contribution to Operation Allied Force in the 
1999 Kosovo war, compared to that of the United States, demonstrated that the European 
Union would have to accelerate its security and defense efforts if it wanted to play a 
larger role on the international stage. This could also prove that the EU’s pledge to 
comply with the provisions of the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, and the Paris 
Charter is not empty but in fact consistent with the European Union’s overall efforts to 
assist in the promotion of international peace and security.  
In sum, the driving factors behind the relatively fast development of the ESDP in 
the last decade were the British initiatives, which stirred the stagnant waters, and the 
necessity of addressing current challenges, which provided the guidelines for the 
formulation of the European Union’s military missions. However, although the 
Petersberg tasks were seen as appropriate for 1990s-style crisis management obligations, 
the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and the ensuing Operation Enduring Freedom 
in Afghanistan, made clear that they are not designed to deal with the new threats. 
Keeping that in mind, the European Convention proposed a new list of updated tasks for 
the European Constitution, and its requirements are analyzed in the next chapter. 
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III. ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED MISSIONS AND 
CORRESPONDING CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Precise terminology is absolutely necessary to understand what is expected from 
the new missions included in the European Constitution. Potential ambiguities and 
unclarified issues may lead to major misperceptions among European Union nations, 
making the conduct of the corresponding operations an extremely difficult endeavor. The 
lack of clarity had already been noticed in the original list of the “Petersberg tasks,” 
which recognized peacemaking as a combat forces’ mission, in contrast to other 
organizations such as the United Nations and NATO, which saw it as “a strictly 
diplomatic undertaking.”31 Similar problems were observed during the 1990s with the 
evolution of peacekeeping and the emergence of peace enforcement operations. For the 
U.S. Armed Forces, those missions fell under the category of “peace operations,” 
whereas NATO and the UK Armed Forces used to call them “peace support operations” 
and “wider peacekeeping” respectively.32  
Therefore, this chapter attempts to define the “updated Petersberg tasks” as 
accurately as possible and identify their capability requirements. The first section 
explores the various current perceptions of the missions’ meaning and comes up with the 
most widely accepted definitions, while the second reviews the kinds of tasks the EU 
civilian agencies and military forces are likely to perform in undertaking those missions.  
B. ANALYSIS OF THE “UPDATED PETERSBERG TASKS” 
According to Working Group VIII of the European Convention, the term conflict 
prevention refers to “a peace support operation employing complementary diplomatic, 
civil and, when necessary, military means, to identify the causes of conflict, support 
monitoring, and take timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation, or resumption of 
                                                 
31 Charles L. Barry, “NATO’s Bold New Concept-CJTF,” Joint Force Quarterly, Number 5, Summer 
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32 Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson, “Sharpening the Weapons of Peace: The Development of a 
Common Military Doctrine for Peace Support Operations,” International Security Information Service 
(ISIS) Europe, Briefing Paper No 18, April 1998, Part I, 2, Available at [http://www.isis-
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hostilities.”33 Michael Lund has offered a more comprehensive definition of conflict 
prevention as the sum of “governmental or nongovernmental actions, policies, and 
institutions that are taken deliberately to keep particular states or organized groups within 
them from threatening or using organized violence, armed force, or related forms of 
coercion such as repression as the means to settle interstate or national political disputes, 
especially in situations where the existing means cannot peacefully manage the 
destabilizing effects of economic, social, political, and international change.”34 The UN 
Security Council has reportedly identified five key component elements of every conflict 
prevention strategy: early warning, preventive diplomacy, preventive deployment, 
preventive disarmament and post-conflict peace-building.35 All of these elements are 
closely interlinked, because the primary goal is to deal with potential conflicts at an early 
stage and prevent them from escalating into armed confrontations. Prevention is better for 
everybody than involvement in a conflict. On the one hand, it protects people from 
suffering the devastating repercussions of a war. On the other, it saves external powers 
the significant amount of effort and resources that would otherwise be required to end the 
bloodshed.36 Precautionary intervention in various hot spots around the world, however, 
is a complex issue. It is usually hindered by the tendency to show indifference in the 
incubation stage of a conflict before the actual violence erupts, and by uncertainty about 
the legitimacy of interference in a state’s domestic affairs. Therefore, it requires a high 
level of political will and a culture of “preventive statecraft”37 to have any chance of 
succeeding.  
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34 Michael S. Lund, “Early Warning and Preventive Diplomacy,” in Chester A. Crocker et al., 
Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict (Washington, DC: United 
States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), 384. 
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The United Nations Staff College has defined the first of the constituent parts of 
conflict prevention, early warning, as “the process of collecting and analyzing 
information for the purpose of identifying and recommending strategic options for 
preventive measures prior to the outbreak of violent conflict.”38 Therefore, it represents 
the most significant step in the whole prevention process, since without timely 
information, the whole process cannot be appropriately set into motion. Its main purpose 
is to continuously examine potentially unstable areas and identify the crucial indicators 
for a violent conflict, such as ethnic or religious hostilities, social upheavals, human 
rights violations, media suppression, etc. The United Nations recognized the significance 
of early warning and set up a mechanism to monitor potential sources of instability, in 
cooperation with other organizations. As a result, the number of cases that external 
powers have failed to address effectively due to a lack of warning has decreased 
significantly in recent years.39  
Moreover, preventive diplomacy, according to the UN definition, is “the use of 
diplomatic measures to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing 
disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the latter when they occur.”40 Critics 
of that definition have pointed out that it is too inclusive as it lays emphasis on actions 
during the whole conflict’s escalatory cycle.41 Indeed, the third part of it cannot actually 
be considered preventive action. The term “preventive” should properly refer to 
diplomatic action undertaken before the eruption of hostilities. Any subsequent effort, as 
will be noted later, falls under the category of “peacemaking.” The initiation of 
confidence-building measures among belligerents such as the “formation of regional or 
subregional risk reduction centres, [and] arrangements for the free flow of information, 
including the monitoring of regional arms agreements,”42 is the best method of defusing 
potential crises which can be promoted through diplomatic efforts. Those efforts, 
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however, presuppose both adversaries’ consent to any kind of mediation; otherwise the 
prospects for a peaceful resolution will be doubtful. The main strength of preventive 
diplomacy often lies in its virtually clandestine functioning. According to UN Secretary 
General Kofi A. Annan, 
Whether it takes the form of mediation, conciliation or negotiation, 
preventive diplomacy is normally non-coercive, low-key and confidential 
in its approach. Its quiet achievements are mostly unheralded; indeed it 
suffers from the irony that when it does succeed, nothing happens. 
Sometimes, the need for confidentiality means that success stories can 
never be told…It is not surprising, therefore, that preventive diplomacy is 
so often unappreciated by the public at large.43 
Preventive deployment refers to the early positioning of military or police forces 
or even political observers to stop rising tensions from escalating.44  In particular, the use 
of military personnel serves the twofold purpose of effectively monitoring the situation 
and deterring any would-be extremists. Moreover, “Like peacekeeping, preventive 
deployment is intended to provide a ‘thin blue line’ to help contain conflicts by building 
confidence in areas of tension or between highly polarized communities.”45 Preventive 
deployment missions should be undertaken: (a) in intra-state conflicts with the consent of 
all parties involved, (b) in cases in which a country feels threatened and asks the United 
Nations for help, and finally (c) in inter-state confrontations when both states agree that 
an international military presence could avert hostilities. 
In addition, preventive disarmament “relates to action intended to reduce the 
number of small arms and limit weapons in conflict-prone regions. Activities include 
curtailing the trafficking in small arms and light weapons and demobilizing combat 
forces as well as collecting and destroying weapons as part of the implementation of a 
peace agreement in order to prevent their future use.”46  
The destabilizing accumulation and uncontrolled spread of small arms may 
impede conflict prevention, and in some cases, may contribute to criminal violence, fuel 
terrorism and/or lead to a breakdown in order. Since approximately 40 to 60% of the 
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world’s trade in small arms is illicit,47 the prevention of illegal arms trafficking is 
considered to be the first step towards the non-proliferation of small arms. Therefore, the 
collection and destruction of small weapons might in some cases discourage potential 
adversaries from resorting to hostilities. According to the United Nations, two categories 
of weapons and munitions deserve significant attention: automatic assault weapons and 
anti-personnel mines.48 Automatic assault weapons have been widely used in all intra-
state conflicts since the end of the Cold War. They are difficult to control because many 
countries acquired them before the end of the Cold War or because criminal groups 
engaged in their illegal distribution have employed sophisticated methods to avoid 
detection. Anti-personnel mines constitute one of the most insidious killing machines that 
mankind ever devised and the main cause of numerous deaths among civilians after the 
termination of hostilities. For this reason, a movement for the prohibition of their use 
mobilized many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and humanitarian groups and 
led to the 1999 Mine Ban Convention (MBC), in Ottawa, Canada.    
Finally, post-conflict peace-building is preventive action taken to inhibit the 
recurrence of conflict comprised of activities and programs which are aimed at creating 
conditions necessary for a sustainable peace in war-torn societies. It is a holistic process 
involving broad-based interagency cooperation across a wide range of issues such as 
demobilization, reconciliation, and institution-building.49  
In addition, according to Nicole Ball,  
The peacebuilding stage also consists of two phases: transition and 
consolidation. Priorities during these two phases center on strengthening 
political institutions, consolidating internal and external security, and 
revitalizing the economy and society. The major objectives during the 
transition phase are to establish a government with a sufficient degree of  
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legitimacy to operate effectively and to implement key reforms mandated 
by the peace accords. The first major objective during the consolidation 
phase is to continue the reform process.50 
In short, post-conflict peace-building is intended to increase cooperation among 
the parties to a conflict and deepen their relationship. The protection of human rights, the 
holding of fair elections, the restoration of law and order, the promotion of various 
economic projects, and the provision of basic utilities for all citizens are only some of the 
measures that could contribute to the social and economic development of the war-torn 
region and render the resumption of hostilities an undesirable option for all parties. 
Moreover, setting up the necessary educational programs could narrow peoples’ ethnic or 
religious differences and promote a shared sense of national identity. In practice, 
however, the implementation of all the above measures has proved to be difficult. The 
involvement of numerous organizations, international (IO), regional (RO), 
nongovernmental (NGO), and private voluntary (PVO), as well as the military makes the 
establishment of an effective coordinating system among them an absolute necessity.51 In 
addition, since post-conflict peace-building represents the final stage of the life cycle of 
any conflict,52 the timing of the termination of its transition phase and the complete 
disengagement of all non-local actors should be determined carefully. Some war-mongers 
may wait for that moment to resume their violent activities and throw the region back to 
chaos. It is noteworthy, for example, that in Bosnia, some influential officials have 
declared that “We have waited five hundred years for this moment and we will wait a few 
more years for you to leave.”53   
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Second, joint disarmament operations, as defined by the Defense Working Group 
of the European Convention, consist of weapons destruction and arms control efforts.54 It 
must be noted that ideologically these two processes differ in their end state. Weapons 
destruction is closer to the idea of disarmament since it advocates the general or limited 
elimination of weapons systems as the main source of instability, whereas arms control 
accepts that weapons have a role to play in international politics and prefers to exercise 
restraint in their acquisition.55 Many observers, however, agree that despite their 
differences, these two programs interact and their common contribution would be to 
reduce the likelihood of war by putting constraints on arms race activities between 
contending sides in various hotspots of the world. The systematic efforts to control the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the restraints in missile 
development for military purposes could reduce the prospects of a holocaust, and become 
the basis for the initiation of further disarmament negotiations, “including the prevention 
of an arms race in outer space.”56 In addition, arms control and disarmament measures 
could lead to the savings of considerable resources for use in support of other priorities, 
including the improvement of a society’s living conditions. In any case, if disarmament 
operations lead to the signing of a treaty, special attention should be given to the 
establishment of effective verification procedures and the imposition of strict sanctions 
on non-compliant states. It is noteworthy, however, that the benefits of disarmament 
successes cannot be reaped unless there is a sincere political willingness for further 
development of bilateral or multilateral relations. As Michael Krepon and Lawrence 
Scheinman point out, “[C]onsensual arms control and disarmament regimes are therefore 
predicated on an already existing political will to transform and consolidate relationships, 
to establish rules and standards to regulate activity in certain defined spheres, and to 
provide mechanisms and processes for dealing with conflict.”57      
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Third, the rubric of military advice and assistance refers, in general, to the 
establishment of military relations between the European Union and other countries or 
organizations. The European Convention also used the term “defence outreach” to 
describe the kinds of activities this mission could entail: “cooperation with the military 
forces of a third country or of a regional/subregional organization on developing 
democratically accountable armed forces, by the exchange of good practices, e.g., 
through training measures.”58 The EU member states could transfer their common 
“Western” military culture to new democracies, thus helping them to create healthy 
relations between their civilian authorities and armed forces. That cooperation could take 
various forms, such as common training, common large-scale exercises, officers’ and 
NCOs’ exchanges in various schools, information exchanges on military issues, advice 
on defense budgeting, technical and financial assistance in building sophisticated training 
facilities, etc. The development of such relations (apart from its apparent benefits for both 
sides) could also create close ties at the political level, thus extending cooperation to 
other issues and making the democratic transition’s efforts easier to achieve. The ultimate 
goal for those efforts could be the promotion of regional and international stability 
through mutual understanding. 
Fourth, post-conflict stabilization, according to a view expressed in the working 
documents of the Working Group VIII-Defense of the European Convention, refers to 
“an operation, focused on training, public security and democratic and military reform 
activities, that seeks to move from a ‘conflict prevention’ phase to return to civilian rule 
with minimal dependence on external military or political support.”59 NATO’s Operation 
Amber Fox in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) was presented as 
an example of this mission.60 Except for the European Convention, however, the term 
post-conflict stabilization has apparently not been adopted by any other organization. 
Furthermore, the activities specified for missions such as these are almost the same as 
those already noted in post-conflict peace-building. After all, as noted above, the ultimate 
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goal of the latter is to “stabilize” the situation in war-torn regions. Therefore, the 
difference between the two missions is more one of terminology than of real substance. 
So, unless the European Union or another organization makes a clear distinction between 
them, this thesis uses the two terms interchangeably, referring to the same actions.  
The final task refers to the support that could be given to a “third country”61 if it 
faced a terrorist threat. Considering the diverging perceptions between the United States 
and several EU nations over the Iraq war, it is assumed that this help could not take the 
form of a preemptive attack. However, the December 2003 European Security Strategy 
(ESS) does not exclude a preventive action, observing that “With the new threats, the first 
line of defence will often be abroad. The new threats are dynamic…This implies that we 
should be ready to act before a crisis occurs.”62 In general, the terrorist issue is of utmost 
importance for all European countries. In the past, some Europeans believed that their 
soil would never be a terrorist target and that the United States would always have the 
lead. This is a false and even dangerous argument since it ignores the fact that Europe 
shares the same ideas and values with the United States and represents a prominent 
proportion of the so-called Western world. Therefore, it is as much at risk as the United 
States.63 Unfortunately, the terrorist bombings that shook Madrid, Spain, on 11 March 
2004 have already proved the validity of that argument. The terrorist threat primarily 
requires solidarity and cooperation among states all over the world if it is to be addressed 
adequately. That is also one of the messages of the European Security Strategy (ESS), 
which recognizes that “no single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems on 
its own.”64 However, what kind of support the European Union should and could provide 
remains to be clarified. Is the discussion about the undertaking of some measures similar 
to those that NATO adopted after the September 2001 attacks (with the exception of the  
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Article 5 invocation), or does it mean full engagement in combat missions, as in 
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan? The requirements for each of those 
missions are quite different and establish the need for very diverse capabilities. 
After having explored the meaning of the new missions, an examination of past 
experience would be helpful to identify more specifically the requirements they set for 
the European Union. 
C. REQUIREMENTS OF THE NEW MISSIONS 
To begin with, the components of conflict prevention, the demands of the early 
warning tasks are not extremely high in personnel and resources. In the information era, 
almost everybody in NATO and the European Union has easy access to databases and 
information-sharing networks, and conflict signposts can be found on-line worldwide. 
However, an institutionalized body is required with the capability to gather all 
information and analyze it. The United Nations first made an effort in 1987 to create an 
Early Warning Unit after failing to predict the 1982 Falklands War between Britain and 
Argentina. Although that unit did not meet with wide support, it became the predecessor 
of a new political branch within the UN Secretariat responsible for global monitoring and 
response in coordination with the United Nations humanitarian and peacekeeping 
agencies. Since 1992, many of the functions of the Secretariat, including the early 
warning activities, have been transferred to a new agency, the Department of Political 
Affairs that is “now organized to follow political developments worldwide, so that it can 
provide early warning of impending conflicts and analyze possibilities for preventive 
action by the United Nations.”65 Its permanent station is at the UN headquarters in New 
York, but it works in close cooperation with UN offices throughout the world. It must 
also be noted that the United Nations exchanges information with various regional 
organizations such as the OSCE, which has been active in that field and has created an 
early warning mechanism within its Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC).66 Military inputs 
could be also useful in monitoring conflict-prone regions. In particular, air and space 
assets such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), reconnaissance aircraft, airborne 
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sensors, and satellites could cover wide areas and gather timely information.67 In 
addition, land and naval patrolling could identify suspect activities before the eruption of 
hostilities.  
Moreover, preventive diplomacy is mostly exercised by professional diplomats of 
international or regional multilateral organizations (RMO) who are sent as heads of 
delegations to various hotspots to act as mediators between confronting parties.68 
Examples of preventive diplomacy successes include the 1993 negotiations between 
Ukraine and Russia for nuclear arms dismantlement as a result of a joint effort involving 
the United States, the UN, and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE); the accommodations between Estonia and Russia under UN and CSCE auspices; 
the resolution of internal tensions in Congo/Brazzaville due to the Organization of 
African Unity’s (OAU) intervention;69 and “the guarding against the rolling back of the 
rights of [ethnic] Hungarians in Slovakia during the Meciar era,”70 thanks to the active 
involvement of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM). In 
general, the OSCE, with the establishment of its preventive diplomacy mechanisms such 
as the HCNM, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), and 
the Long-Term Preventive Diplomacy Mission (LPDM), sets the best model for the role 
of regional organizations in preventive diplomacy activities.71 Those efforts, however, 
need not be limited to officials but could be undertaken by individuals as well. According 
to the 1999 Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the [United Nations] 
Organization, 
So-called “citizen diplomacy” sometimes paves the way for subsequent 
official agreements. For example, former United States President Jimmy 
Carter’s visit to Pyongyang in June 1994 helped to resolve a crisis over the 
nuclear weapons programme of the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea and set in motion a process that led directly to an agreement in 
October that year between that country and the United States of America. 
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In the Middle East process, it was a small Norwegian research institute 
that played the critical initial role in paving the way for the 1993 Oslo 
Agreement.72 
Furthermore, preventive deployment constitutes military support to preventive 
diplomacy’s efforts to deter conflict.73 The first and only UN preventive deployment 
operation to date took place from 31 March 1995 to 28 February 1999, in the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).74 The so-called UNPREDEP (United 
Nations Preventive Deployment) Force’s mandate was to monitor and report any 
developments on FYROM’s borders with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (to the 
north) and Albania (to the west), which could undermine confidence and stability in 
FYROM and threaten its territorial integrity and, in addition, to offer ad hoc community 
services and humanitarian assistance to the local population.75 To that end, 1,049 army 
troops (two battalions) were deployed by February 1999 in FYROM’s territory manning 
24 permanent and 33 temporary observation posts along a 420 km borderline.76 
UNPREDEP contributed significantly to hindering the spread of conflicts from 
neighboring areas to FYROM. Besides its general stabilizing contribution, UNPREDEP’s 
presence inspired confidence in that small country’s leaders and population and allowed 
them to make progressive steps towards political and economic development. The 
eruption of hostilities between FYROM’s National Army and ethnic Albanian forces in 
2000 suggested that the decision to withdraw was a mistake.  
In addition, preventive disarmament requires tight control of border areas and 
other points of entries where unlawful arms transfers usually take place, as well as 
extensive search capabilities. Consequently, it is a demanding task to be assigned to a few 
observers or police personnel, and only military forces are efficient in playing that role. 
Those forces are usually assigned to a broader peace operation, and the range of their 
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responsibilities is not limited solely to disarmament issues. “The assembly, control and 
disposal of weapons has been a central feature of most of the comprehensive peace 
settlements in which the United Nations has played a peace-keeping role.”77 For 
example, UNPREDEP’s obligation to detect illicit arms flows in FYROM’s borders was 
part of its overall mission to monitor and report all kinds of conflict-prone developments 
in the country. Moreover, the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) undertook Project 
Harvest in 1998 in an effort “to collect and destroy unregistered weapons and ordnance in 
private hands”78 as part of its overall mandate to provide a stable and secure environment 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina. A similar operation was launched by the NATO Kosovo Force 
(KFOR) with noteworthy success.79  
Continuing with joint disarmament, its arms control portion mostly requires 
diplomatic efforts carried out by a limited number of delegations. Those attempts usually 
lead to long-lasting negotiations. The Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms, 
better known as the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks treaty (SALT I), and the first 
Strategic Arms Reductions Talks treaty (START I), both concluded between the United 
States and the Soviet Union, placed limits on certain weapons delivery systems. The 2002 
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), also known as the Moscow Treaty, 
between the United States and Russia represents a commitment to make significant 
reductions in both countries’ operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads by the 
end of 2012. In addition, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) has 
effectively reduced the acquisition efforts of its signatory states concerning certain 
categories of weaponry.  
According to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, military forces could also contribute 
to arms control activities by “verifying an arms control treaty; seizing WMD (nuclear, 
biological, and chemical or conventional); escorting authorized deliveries of weapons and 
other materials (such as enriched uranium) to preclude loss or unauthorized use of these 
assets; or dismantling, destroying, or disposing of weapons and hazardous 
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material…[and] conducting and hosting site inspections, participating in military data 
exchanges, and implementing armament reductions.”80 As for weapons destruction, the 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention (BTWC) represent the best examples of that kind of agreement.81 Military 
forces could also be deployed to organize and conduct the collection and destruction of 
weapons.  For example, Operation Essential Harvest, undertaken by 3,500 NATO troops 
in FYROM from 22 August to 23 September 2001, led to the destruction of a total of 
3,800 weapons.82 
Moreover, the activities of military advice and assistance are similar to those of 
NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) project. After all, that was clearly stated by the 
members of the European Convention’s Working Group VIII-Defense who mentioned 
that “Such a programme would therefore encompass a number of the activities and 
objectives undertaken within NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme.”83 That plan 
would require the creation of some coordinating bodies, such as the PfP’s Political-
Military Steering Committee, the Partnership Coordination Cell, and the Partnership Staff 
Elements,84 to organize the various activities and guarantee that they meet their 
objectives. Those bodies’ demands, in personnel and resources, are not prohibitive and 
can be easily met by the EU budget. In addition, the conduct of exercises or other military 
activities would take place at the existing EU member states’ national facilities and 
would not place a significant burden on the participating countries. It must be noted that 
NATO has already granted PfP training status to the facilities of three EU countries 
(Austria, Greece, and Sweden), two of which are not NATO members (Austria and 
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Sweden).85 Furthermore, many EU member states have been engaged in military 
assistance projects during the past decade, launching bilateral projects with former 
communist countries. For example, Greece has signed separate military agreements with 
Albania, FYROM, and Bulgaria.86 
Furthermore, the United Nations has been active in the field of post-conflict 
peace-building or stabilization; and, taking advantage of this experience, it has assigned 
those specific responsibilities to its Department of Political Affairs.87 In addition, local 
political offices have been organized in each area of interest to ensure better coordination 
between the various types of assistance. The strength of those political offices may vary 
from a few persons to much larger staffs. For example, in 2002, the total number of 
personnel in the UN Peace-Building Support Office in Liberia (UNOL) was 25 people, 
whereas the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) included up to 440 
people.88 It must be noted, though, that the extensive amount of work in those missions 
requires their close coordination with the corresponding peacekeeping operations. In that 
case, the military forces, apart from their primary role in maintaining security and 
stability in the area, are also assigned other tasks such as providing armed escorts and 
medical care; rebuilding schools and hospitals; restoring electrical power, water systems, 
telecommunications, and the transportation infrastructure; clearing mines; carrying out 
demobilization and weapons destruction programs; and distributing humanitarian aid. All 
these efforts depart from the traditional sense of peacekeeping missions and have thus 
earned the title “third generation peacekeeping.” According to Tom Woodhouse and 
Oliver Ramsbotham, “This has become necessary…as stability operations contingents are 
often the only entities capable of providing critical services in non-war/non-peace 
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environments at decisive moments in post-war transitions.”89 The strength of the 
personnel required to perform these tasks depends on a variety of factors, the most 
important of which are the size of the country, the magnitude of residual tensions, and the 
amount of damage inflicted to the country’s infrastructure. In general, compared to other 
missions, post-conflict stabilization efforts appear to be more demanding in the amount 
of troops and resources required. For example, the strength of the Implementation Force 
(IFOR) in Bosnia in 1995 was about 60,000 troops,90 whereas the Kosovo Force 
(KFOR), at the beginning of the mission in 1999, amounted to approximately 50,000 
people.91 
As for support in combating terrorism, the European Union could provide states 
attacked by terrorists with assistance to expand their options in fighting against them and 
in consequence management. To that end, it could learn from NATO’s action, taken after 
the September 2001 attacks, at the U.S. government’s request. In particular, as a result of 
the invocation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Allies agreed to take the 
following eight measures on 4 and 8 October 2001: enhance intelligence sharing and 
cooperation relating to terrorism; assist Allies and others subject to increased terrorist 
threats; increase security for U.S. and allied facilities; backfill Allied assets in NATO’s 
area of responsibility required for operations against terrorism; grant blanket overflight 
clearances for US and Allied aircraft; provide access to ports and airfields; deploy 
Standing Naval Forces (STANAVFORMED) elements to the Eastern Mediterranean; and 
deploy NATO AWACS aircraft to the US.92 However, as already noted, if the assistance 
implies the undertaking of combat missions such as Operation Enduring Freedom in 
Afghanistan, robust military capabilities will be required. For instance, fully equipped 
combat and combat support units, advanced information systems, strategic and 
operational air and sea lift capabilities, precision guided munitions, interoperable 
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communications, effective command and control assets, all weather aircraft, cruise 
missiles, navigation systems, and air-refueling capabilities will be required. Apart from 
the necessary resources, the intensive training of all participating forces and headquarters 
would be of equal importance, to promote a common understanding of the operational 
strategy and maximize their combined effects. 
To summarize, the updated list of the “Petersberg tasks” includes a mixture of 
peacetime activities, post-conflict stabilization, and support to third countries in 
combating terrorism. It remains to be seen in the following chapter whether the European 
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IV. THE EUROPEAN UNION’S CAPABILITIES: AN OVERALL 
ASSESSMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As noted earlier, the 1999 “Helsinki Headline Goal” identified the number of 
forces required for the European Union to undertake the most demanding of its 
Petersberg tasks. Some scholars, however, raised questions about the purpose of that 
objective and what the Helsinki Headline Goal capabilities could really accomplish. For 
example, according to David Yost, the Headline Goal seemed to suggest “that the EU’s 
current aspirations extend to being able to undertake only peacekeeping missions, not a 
combat action like Operation Allied Force.”93 The serious deficiencies in various critical 
military capabilities had also been recognized by the EU officials who launched the 
European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP), in March 2002, with the aim of proposing 
potential solutions.94 The ECAP process is still in progress. As a result, the General 
Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), held in Brussels on 19-20 May 2003, 
declared that “the EU now has operational capability across the full range of the 
Petersberg tasks, limited and constrained by recognized shortfalls.”95 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the current and future prospects of the 
European Union to undertake the updated Petersberg tasks and acquire credible military 
forces. The first section deals with the EU capabilities, based on the new missions’ 
requirements analyzed in the previous chapter, while the second section offers a brief 
account of the efforts made by the European Union to address its most significant 
shortfalls and enhance its military potential. It must be noted that, since the “Helsinki 
Force Catalogue”96 has not been officially published and the draft treaty of the 
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Constitution for the European Union does not identify specific forces for carrying out the 
new missions, the examination of the EU capabilities will be based on the member states’ 
national inventories before the May 2004 enlargement.  
B. ARE THE EU FORCES CAPABLE OF PERFORMING THE NEW 
TASKS?   
1. Peacetime Activities 
Conflict prevention has been one of the main objectives of the European Union’s 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) since its very beginning. In order to 
improve the EU member states’ preventive capabilities, the European Council, held in 
Göteborg, Sweden, on 15-16 June 2001, approved the Programme for the Prevention of 
Violent Conflicts, which set the basic guidelines for the European Union’s efforts and 
called on future presidencies to present reports on the progress made.97 As for conflict 
prevention’s constituent parts, early warning capabilities were given special attention, 
with the creation of the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU), under the 
responsibility of the Secretary General/High Representative (SG/HR)98. The mission of 
that unit is to monitor and analyze CFSP-relevant developments, and provide timely 
assessments and early warning of significant events for the European Union’s security 
interests.99 Its staff consists of 20 specialists from the General Secretariat of the European 
Council (3), the member states (15), the European Commission (1) and the WEU (1).100 
The important work in the early warning area was recognized by the Greek Presidency’s 
third annual report on conflict prevention, submitted to the Thessaloniki European 
Council, on 20 June 2003: 
In support of this work, the flow of information and intelligence from 
Member States has been improved. Steps are being taken to ensure that 
account is taken of early warning reports in agenda planning. Frequent 
staff to staff meetings between the EU and international organizations 
such as the UN, OSCE and NATO contribute to gather information for 
es. In early 2003, the Commission updated its early warning purpos
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country conflict assessments covering more than 120 countries. These 
assessments formed the basis for the Commission’s contribution on early 
warning and provided analytical input to ensure a systematic treatment of 
conflict issues in Country Strategy Papers and mid-term reviews.101    
The European Union’s military forces engaged in peacekeeping tasks could also 
constitute a significant early warning asset. The EU reconnaissance aircraft and imagery 
satellites could extend the area of monitoring to neighboring regions or countries during 
an SFOR or KFOR-type operation.102 In addition, EU troops in Bosnia and Kosovo have 
organized numerous foot and vehicular patrols as well as traffic control points (TCP) to 
observe any suspicious activities, and have used utility and attack helicopters extensively 
to support intelligence collectors at the tactical level.  Moreover, naval units from various 
EU member states have continuously participated in naval patrolling activities undertaken 
by NATO, e.g. in the Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED).  
As for preventive diplomacy, preventive deployment and preventive disarmament, 
they are all interrelated EU activities, which could take place in parallel or sequentially 
during the conflict avoidance cycle. Preventive diplomacy has always been the strong 
area of the EU civilian sector, which has coupled the EU officials’ diplomatic expertise 
with significant humanitarian and economic aid to resolve potential crises. The European 
Commission is the leading EU agency in this domain, and it relies on the Rapid Reaction 
Mechanism to act quickly in pre-crisis situations.103  
In addition, EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) are appointed to areas of special 
attention, such as Afghanistan, the Balkans (three EUSRs, one for Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
FYROM and the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, respectively), the Great Lakes 
region in Africa, the Middle East, and the South Caucasus.104 The role of those 
representatives is to follow developments closely in their assigned areas and promote the 
implementation of established EU policies. For example, the mandate of the EUSR for 
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the Middle East region is based on the EU policy objectives of a two-state solution in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict,105 a goal also promoted by the quartet (the European Union, 
Russia, the United Nations and the United States) Middle East Road Map.106  
Moreover, the European Council has undertaken various diplomatic initiatives to 
address EU and international challenges. For example, EU foreign ministers have been 
engaged in negotiations with countries suspected of promoting WMD proliferation and 
assisting terrorist groups, such as Syria, and they required a non-proliferation clause in 
the text of a trade and aid agreement with Damascus.107 Furthermore, the EU Troika 
(composed of representatives from the previous, the current, and the next presidency) is 
another diplomatic tool, which the European Union uses to resolve long-standing 
deadlocks. For example, it was the mediation of the Foreign Ministers of Britain, France 
and Germany that managed to resolve the impasse over the Iranian nuclear program by 
convincing the country’s authorities to accept the UN International Atomic Energy 
Agency’s (IAEA) inspections.108 Finally, the EU presidency and the SG/HR are also the 
sources of many diplomatic initiatives in various hot spots around the world.  
Moreover, preventive deployment missions give a more coercive tone to 
preventive diplomacy’s efforts and are to be conducted in more polarized situations. In 
any case, the required capabilities include armed forces capable of carrying out patrolling 
and monitoring activities, working in accordance with the traditional lines of UN 
peacekeeping, and therefore “authorized to use force [only] in self-defence.”109 Small 
combat support elements should be also deployed to add deterrent value to the mission 
and contribute to the observation tasks. When, however, the onset of hostilities is 
imminent, a more “muscular” force is required both in numbers and equipment, deployed 
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under the UN Charter’s Chapter VII provisions.110 The EU countries maintain a 
significant number of troops (the 15 EU countries’ total forces amount approximately to 
1,500,000 people)111 that could meet all plausible preventive deployment mission 
requirements. In addition, the EU inventory of armored personnel carriers (APCs), tanks, 
self-propelled artillery pieces, ground monitoring stations, general utility and attack 
helicopters, and intra-theater cargo aircraft112 could prove to be sufficient for these kinds 
of missions. Furthermore, the EU forces could take advantage of the experience gained 
by the six EU nations which participated in UNPREDEP (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
Ireland, Portugal, and Sweden).113  
The preventive disarmament mission could be part of an overall preventive 
deployment operation that would not call for any extra personnel or capabilities to 
guarantee the necessary security conditions. In addition, the whole process of 
disarmament (including the collection, inventory, dismantlement, and destruction of 
weapons such as pistols, rifles, and other guns) does not require any rare expertise that is 
not available among the EU military forces’ services. Logistical needs, for setting up and 
running melting down facilities, might be increased, but this should not be considered a 
problem for the European Union’s financial resources. Troops from EU nations have 
been actively involved in these kinds of activities undertaken by SFOR and KFOR and by 
the NATO units in FYROM. For example, the SFOR German-Italian Battle Group 
collected and destroyed, in the period from May to July 2003, 743 small arms and 
accessories.114   
Almost all EU countries have participated in joint disarmament operations. EU 
member states’ diplomats participated in the negotiations between NATO and Warsaw 
Pact countries which resulted in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 
(CFE), signed in Paris on 19 November 1990.115 Military officials also took part in 
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consultations providing their respective delegations with the necessary technical expertise 
on the five types of equipment under limitation: armored personnel carriers, tanks, 
artillery pieces, attack helicopters and combat aircraft. The most important contribution 
that the EU military forces have been making since then, however, is to the verification 
process. Most of the EU countries have organized effective systems of conducting and 
hosting on-site inspections, either scheduled or unexpected, in accordance with the 
treaty’s provisions. The challenge of bringing various skills together, such as inspection 
team leaders, deputies, linguists and weapons specialists as well as the establishment of a 
rigorous curriculum for those teams’ training,116 has not been difficult for the EU 
national armed forces. Moreover, along with the inspection teams, specific escort groups 
have been created, responsible for providing the visiting inspectors with the necessary 
support and any extra information they might require. As for the weapons destruction 
mission, the EU military agencies have, as already noted, the necessary capabilities and 
experience. In addition, they could take stock of their successful participation in NATO’s 
Operation Essential Harvest in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Task Force 
Harvest was composed primarily of troops from EU nations, with 9 of the 14 ESDP 
participant states contributing troops and equipment. Specifically, the brigade-level task 
force consisted of 4 battalions provided by Britain, France, Greece, and Italy, whereas 
Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain assigned approximately 1,100 
troops.117 These troops collected, in only 30 days, 3,875 weapon systems (3,210 assault 
rifles, 483 machine guns, 162 mortars/anti-tank launchers, 17 air-defense weapon 
systems and 4 tanks/APCs) and 397,625 miscellaneous items, including mines, 
explosives and ammunition.118  
Furthermore, EU member states would face no problem in launching military 
advice and assistance programs with other countries. All EU partners participate in 
NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) project and have the knowledge and the resources 
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required for undertaking a similar effort at the EU level. The establishment, however, of 
the necessary organizing bodies within the current ESDP institutional framework should 
receive the EU military authorities’ special attention. Additionally, the defense assistance 
endeavor should be consistent with the provisions of the European Security Strategy 
(ESS) and promote effective cooperative action against the threats posed by terrorism and 
WMD proliferation.  
2. Post-Conflict Stabilization 
As for post-conflict stabilization, since EU member states have participated in 
various reconstruction efforts under United Nations and OSCE auspices, the European 
Union has the knowledge to set up its own mechanisms and further improve its 
capabilities in this field. As for the EU military forces, their primary role in post-conflict 
stabilization operations to maintain security, public safety and order, distinguishes their 
relevant capabilities into two categories, depending on the permissiveness of the 
environment.  
On the one hand, in non-permissive situations, the European Union should be able 
to deploy combat-ready forces to deter potential aggressors and respond, if necessary, to 
any provocation. The 60,000-strong IFOR could serve as a model for the size of the EU 
combat forces, which could undertake a mission of equivalent magnitude with an 
additional pool of 120,000 military personnel for combat support and logistical 
activities.119 As noted earlier, the European Union should be able to meet that goal, 
despite the fact that approximately 20% of the EU countries’ armed forces are still 
conscripts.120 Moreover, most EU countries are likely to reserve a significant number of 
troops for national, NATO or EU contingencies. In qualitative terms, however, the forces 
of European Union nations do not possess the state-of-the art capabilities that would be 
required to undertake major operations without the assistance of the United States.121  
On the other hand, in permissive environments, the troops of the European Union 
nations are not expected to face any serious difficulties. Although security should always 
be the main consideration, the reduction of tensions and the gradual transition to a more 
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peaceful situation could allow the EU forces to assume a larger role. That has already 
been proven in Bosnia and Kosovo, where the EU forces constitute 53% and 69% 
respectively of the total international input.122 It must be also noted that in both 
permissive and non-permissive cases the EU armed forces are able to contribute to the 
reconstruction efforts. More specifically, the EU engineers could help in rebuilding 
schools and hospitals; restoring electrical power, water systems and telecommunications; 
repairing the transportation infrastructure; and constructing camps for displaced civilians 
or refugees.123 EU ordnance disposal teams could execute the necessary de-mining 
operations, and EU medical personnel could provide medical assistance to the local 
population.124 The ability of the European Union to undertake medium-intensity post-
conflict stabilization operations has already been acknowledged by NATO, which may 
hand SFOR command responsibility over to the European Union by the end of 2004.125 
In executing the SFOR mission, the EU forces could benefit from the experience gained 
in their two low-intensity military missions conducted in 2003, Operation Concordia in 
FYROM and Operation Artemis in DRC. 
3. Combating Terrorism 
a. Capabilities Analysis 
The EU assistance that could be given to a third country in combating 
terrorism in its territory depends, as previously noted, on the overall situation. First, it 
could be limited to intelligence efforts comparable to those undertaken after the 
September 2001 terrorist attacks. Many EU countries fighting against their own domestic 
terrorist groups (IRA in the United Kingdom, ETA in Spain, Red Brigades in Italy, 
Corsican terrorists in France, and 17 November in Greece) have gained useful knowledge 
to employ in the struggle against international terrorism.126 Information exchange 
channels had been established between European Union states and the United States even  
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before September 2001. For example, French intelligence provided U.S. authorities with 
enough information to arrest an Algerian national named Ahmed Rezam, whose goal was 
to detonate explosives in Los Angeles during the millennium celebrations.127  
Moreover, after September 2001, most of the EU member states, whether 
as members of NATO or individually, took actions similar to those decided by the 
Atlantic Alliance on 4 and 8 October 2001, described in the previous chapter. For 
example, they have undertaken thorough investigations in the Balkans to eradicate 
terrorist groups with possible Al Qaeda links, tightened security measures affecting U.S. 
military and civilian potential targets, and offered their airspace and other facilities to 
U.S. military forces.128 In addition, the participation of some EU members in NATO’s 
Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED)129 anti-terrorism assignment 
in the Eastern Mediterranean has added value to the European Union’s capacity to 
execute such operations. However, if the third country requested the provision of some 
critical military equipment, like the AWACS units that the United States asked NATO to 
provide, the EU authorities could find themselves in an embarrassing position. Among all 
the EU member states, Britain possesses 6 E-3Ds and France operates 4 E-3Fs, a total of 
10 of this kind of aircraft.130 That number could prove to be insufficient even in the case 
of a limited request, since the European Union lacks the necessary backup units to 
respond to other contingencies. By contrast, when NATO sent the requested five 
AWACS aircraft to the United States, it still had a significant pool of reserve assets.131 
Finally, NATO and EU countries have participated since November 2002 in various 
measures under the Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism, one of the main 
objectives of which is “Upon request, provide assistance to EAPC [Euro-Atlantic 
Partnership Council] States in dealing with the risks and consequences of terrorist 
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attacks, including on their economic and other critical infrastructure.”132 Non-NATO EU 
states, including Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden, might also be willing to become 
involved in these activities.133      
Second, if the support against terrorism took the form of a scenario 
comparable to Operation Enduring Freedom, the European Union would probably face 
significant problems, at least in the immediate future. Operation Enduring Freedom, 
which was launched in October 2001 to overthrow the Taliban regime and eradicate the 
backbone of the Al Qaeda terrorist network, presented some distinct characteristics, such 
as the extensive use of special operations forces (SOF) and precision guided munitions 
(PGMs) as well as relying on indigenous troops of the Northern Alliance as the main 
ground force.134 The synergistic effects of SOF, PGMs and Northern Alliance forces 
gained the title of the “Afghan Model”135 and led U.S. President George W. Bush to say 
that  
This combination -- real-time intelligence, local allied forces, special 
forces, and precision air power-- has really never been used before. The conflict in 
Afghanistan has taught us more about the future of our military than a decade of blue-
ribbon panels and think tank symposiums.136  
Critics of the Afghan Model, however, did not share President Bush’s 
ideas and argued that, despite the innovations this conflict introduced, traditional 
elements of the Western way of war remained intact. Small numbers of commandos and 
PGMs proved to be less effective as the war progressed and the Taliban and Al Qaeda  
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forces adopted better techniques of dispersion, cover and concealment. In response, 
coalition forces had to employ the fundamental methods of modern joint warfare based 
on the utilization of fires and maneuver. As Stephen Biddle pointed out,  
what Afghanistan really shows is that the wars of tomorrow—like those of 
yesterday—will require tight integration of fires and ground maneuver at 
close quarters to exploit technology’s effects. Precision weapons make this 
combination more powerful, but against resolute opponents, neither air 
power nor conventional ground forces alone will suffice any time soon.137  
The conditions that prevailed in Afghanistan may have been unique, and 
more allied dismounted infantry might be needed in future cases.  
Operation Enduring Freedom made clear once again (after Operation 
Deliberate Force in Bosnia and Operation Allied Force in Kosovo) the significant 
deficiencies of the EU nations’ military forces. Among all EU members only Britain, 
France, Germany and Italy showed a willingness to participate in combat missions, but 
their contributions were much smaller than those of the United States.138  
Britain deployed some of its airborne early warning, air-refueling, 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets and also made some Tomahawk 
cruise missile strikes against terrorist training camps from its two nuclear-powered 
submarines assigned to the Gulf area, the HMS Trafalgar and the HMS Triumph.139 In 
addition, “as of early November 2001, marines from the 3 Commando Brigade, the 
army’s mountain and winter warfare specialists,”140 were attached to the coalition forces.  
France assigned its only carrier battle group to support operations in the 
North Arabian Sea, and the 16 Super Étendards, 2 Rafales and 2 Hawkeyes embarked on 
the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier141 had flown more than 2,000 hours by the end of 
June 2002, supporting the coalition with air reconnaissance, strikes and early warning 
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missions.142 France also deployed 6 Mirage-2000 fighter aircraft for close air support 
(CAS) missions143 and 2 KC-135 tanker aircraft for air refueling144 to Kyrgyzstan, a 
number of C-160 and C-130 aircraft to Tajikistan, to provide airlift support, and some 
Atlantique aircraft to Djibouti, to participate in intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance (ISR) missions.145    
Germany, according to Thérèse Delpech, made a less publicized–for its 
own political reasons–contribution to that operation by sending hundreds of Special 
Forces but no combat aircraft.146 It deployed only 3 C-160 transport aircraft, to Incirlik, 
Turkey, to assist U.S. Air Force operations147 and some support naval units, to the Gulf 
of Aden, beginning in January 2002.148  
Italy deployed its only carrier battle group in the North Arabian Sea on 18 
November 2001, with 8 Harrier aircraft, 4 Sea King helicopters, and 1,400 troops 
embarked.149  
The operational data available demonstrate that U.S. forces executed the 
overwhelming majority of the combat missions. U.S. aircraft in the first three-month 
period of the war (October-December 2001) flew 92% of the total sorties and the rest of 
the coalition forces (EU and non-EU participants) 8%.150 In addition, of the 
approximately 10,000 precision guided weapons that had been dropped by February 
2002, 99% were delivered by the United States.151  
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b. The EU Military Deficiencies  
In general, the Afghan conflict showed that the European Union is not 
able to undertake operations of that type and magnitude without U.S. participation, 
because it lacks the necessary capabilities in several areas. 
In strategic airlift, the United States possesses 126 C-5 Galaxy, 101 C-17 
Globemaster III, and 77 C-141 Starlifter152 aircraft with unparalleled troop and cargo 
capacities, as well as with in-flight refueling capabilities, whereas most of the EU 
countries operate the far smaller C-130 and C-160 aircraft, appropriate solely for intra-
theater flights. Britain and France are the only EU countries which have acquired a 
limited number of larger transport aircraft. Britain has leased 4 C-17 aircraft from 
Boeing153 whereas France owns 3 A-310-300 and 2 DC-8F aircraft.154  
In strategic sealift, the United States possesses, in total, 12 LHAs-LHDs, 
26 LSDs-LPDs, and approximately 200 landing craft,155 whereas the top five EU military 
powers (EU-5: Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain) have not acquired any LHA-
LHD ships and could draw together 22 LSDs-LPDs and 83 landing craft.156  
In power projection capabilities, Britain, France, Italy and Spain are the 
only EU countries with aircraft carriers. Except for the French Charles de Gaulle, 
however, which is a nuclear-powered and large-deck carrier with a capacity of about 40 
aircraft,157 these carriers (the three British Invincible-type, the Italian Garibaldi and the 
Spanish Principe de Asturias) are diesel-powered and accommodate a much smaller 
number of aircraft ranging from 6 to 16 vertical/short take-off and landing (V/STOL) 
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Harriers.158 These aircraft carriers cannot be compared with the 12 U.S. carriers (nine 
nuclear-powered and three conventional ones), each of which is able to carry 50 fighters 
and 24 support aircraft.159  
In the C4 ISTAR160 spectrum, Britain and France are the only countries 
which have acquired airborne early warning and command and control systems such as 
the E-3 Sentry aircraft,161 whereas no EU country possesses battle management and 
ground surveillance aircraft like the U.S. E-8C JSTARS.162 In addition, most of the EU 
member states still depend on limited-range reconnaissance aircraft163 and have not yet 
procured more sophisticated information-gathering systems. With the exception of Spain, 
the rest of the EU forces can employ only tactical unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)164 
with a limited range of 200-300 km.165  
In space activities, except for the Galileo civilian navigation program, 
which is a full EU undertaking scheduled to materialize in 2008,166 EU member states 
have opted for either their own national programs or limited joint initiatives. More 
specifically, in observation satellites, France operates the Helios-I (Italy has a 14% share 
of participation and Spain a 7% share),167 whereas Britain, Germany and Italy have opted 
                                                 
158 Ibid., 48, 56 and 60. 
159 U.S. NWC, Joint Military Operations-Reference Guide-Forces/Capabilities Handbook, 10-11. 
160 The acronym C4 ISTAR stands for Command, Control, Communications, Computers and 
Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance. 
161 Günter Endres and Mike Gething, Jane’s Aircraft Recognition Guide (London, UK: Harper 
Collins Publishers, 2002), 435. 
162 U.S. Air Force (USAF), E-8C JSTARS Fact Sheet, 1, Available at 
[http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet_print.asp?fsID=100&page=1], Accessed 20 April 2004.  
163 Within the EU-5 circle, France still uses 43 Mirage-F1s and 5 MIVPs, Germany employs 41 
Tornados, Italy makes use of 13 Atlantics, Spain operates 6 C-212s, and the United Kingdom depends on 
53 Tornados GR4A, 39 Jaguars GR3/3A and 4 Canberras PR-9. Source: The Military Balance 2003-2004. 
164 Britain possesses the Phoenix-type UAVs, France employs the CL-289s and the Hunters, Germany 
uses the CL-289s too, and Italy operates the Mirach. Source: The Military Balance 2003-2004. 
165 More information about the various UAV types are available at 
[http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/uav.htm], Accessed 21 April 2004.   
166 European Commission-Directorate General for Energy and Transport, Galileo-A European 
Initiative, Brochure, Available at [http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/energy_transport/galileo_leaflet_en.pdf], 
Accessed 28 April 2004.  
167 Federation of American Scientists, World Space Guide-Helios, Available at 
[http://www.fas.org/spp/guide/france/military/imint/], Accessed 25 April 2004.  
46 
for their Topsat, SAR Lupe and Cosmo Skymed satellites, respectively.168Additionally, in 
communication satellites, four of the EU-5 countries have followed their own way with 
the British Skynet, the French Syracuse, the Italian Sicral, and the Spanish Hispasat 
already in orbit.169  
In combat aircraft, the EU forces should face fewer problems, but some 
worrisome indicators still exist. Specifically, although the 15 EU member states together 
maintain about 2,500 fighters, a significant number of these aircraft cannot make 
precision strikes at night or under adverse weather conditions. In addition, the EU 
fighters include some 15 different types,170 many of which have incompatible 
communication systems and other interoperability problems. It must be noted, however, 
that the European Union could muster 500 aircraft with modern radar systems and 
missiles as well as 400 all-weather air defense aircraft,171 which would constitute a 
sufficient force package for the required 25 to 200 sorties per day of an Enduring 
Freedom-type air operation.172  
The EU’s options to conduct successful air operations away from the 
European mainland are further reduced by its member states’ limited air-to-air refueling 
(AAR) capabilities, since only Britain and France maintain such aircraft. Britain has nine 
Tristars and 19 VC-10s,173 which are somewhat outdated and need to be replaced or 
modernized, whereas France has only 3 KC-135s and 11 C-135FRs,174 an insufficient 
number for large-scale operations.  
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The European Union is far behind the United States in combat search and 
rescue (CSAR) capabilities with only France,175 Greece and Italy trying to make some 
remedial efforts.176 
Finally, another area of unease for the EU military authorities is the lack 
of sufficient self-protection capabilities for their aircraft, which limits their operational 
effectiveness in high-intensity environments. The EU member states have limited 
themselves to tactical jamming capabilities, supplying their aircraft with U.S. HARM and 
U.K. ALARM weapons for Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) missions. EU 
nations lack offensive electronic warfare aircraft, such as the U.S. EA-6B Prowlers, able 
to shut down enemy radars.   
In sum, the armed forces of European Union nations could undertake the 
peacetime activities and the peace operations included in the updated “Petersberg tasks” 
list, with some reservations about post-conflict stabilization in non-permissive 
environments. As for combating terrorism, the military forces of European Union 
countries could respond effectively to any request which did not require advanced war-
fighting capabilities. What efforts, however, is the European Union making to address its 
shortfalls and improve its military posture?  
C. THE WAY AHEAD 
The European Convention, recognizing the need for the improvement of the 
European Union’s capabilities, has included in the draft treaty of the Constitution for the 
European Union the creation of a new mechanism, the European Armaments, Research 
and Military Capabilities Agency, with the aim to:  
• contribute to identifying the Member States’ military capability 
objectives and evaluating observance of the capability 
commitments given by the Member States; 
• promote harmonisation of operational needs and adoption of 
effective, compatible procurement methods; 
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• propose multilateral projects to fulfil the objectives in terms of 
military capabilities, ensure coordination of the programmes 
implemented by the Member States and management of specific 
cooperation programmes; 
• support defense technology research, and coordinate and plan joint 
research activities and the study of technical solutions meeting 
future operational needs; [and] 
• contribute to identifying and, if necessary, implementing any 
useful measure for strengthening the industrial and technological 
base of the defence sector and for improving the effectiveness of 
military expenditure.177 
This agency, which will be open to all member states, could promote the 
EU industrial integration process and oversee the readiness of forces available to the 
European Union. Cooperation on armaments issues, however, will not be a new endeavor 
for many of the European Union nations. Some of its member states have created, since 
the end of the Cold War, specific organizations, such as the Western European 
Armaments Group (WEAG), the Organization for Joint Armaments Cooperation 
(OCCAR-Organisme Conjoint de Coopération en matière d’Armement), and the Letter of 
Intent (LoI), for the promotion of multilateral or bilateral defense projects. The main 
purpose of these initiatives was to find more cost-effective solutions for the development 
of complex defense equipment, which has become extremely expensive, even for the 
biggest economic powers of the European Union.178 Either within these mechanisms or 
independently, some of the European Union countries, including Britain, France, 
Germany, Italy and Spain, have launched important projects; and this suggests that the 
EU efforts could slowly but steadily make progress.  
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Britain has focused on the procurement of: 25 A400M strategic transport 
aircraft, by 2011;179 two new aircraft carriers called the Future Aircraft Carriers (CVF), 
expected to enter into service in 2012 and 2015;180 the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) aircraft 
(the exact number has not yet been determined), by 2012, to replace the aging 
Harriers;181 five Airborne Stand Off Radar (ASTOR) aircraft (with functions similar to 
the U.S. E-8C JSTARS) scheduled to achieve operational capability by 2008;182 and the 
Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft (FSTA)  to replace the current Tristar and VC 10 aircraft 
(the project is still in a preliminary phase).183 
France has directed its efforts to the acquisition of 50 A400M transport 
aircraft by October 2009,184 the deployment of a new Helios-II satellite by 2005,185 and 
the procurement of 57 and 19 Rafale fighters for the Air Force and Navy, respectively.186  
Germany has focused on the acquisition of 60 A400M transport aircraft 
and the completion of the 180 Eurofighter aircraft deliveries.  
Italy, despite its procurement budget cuts, seems determined to continue as 
scheduled with the acquisition of a second aircraft carrier, the Andrea Doria, by 2007,187 
and the first deliveries of a new Boeing 767 transport/tanker aircraft from 2005.188  
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Finally, Spain has become the pioneer country in amphibious capabilities 
programs by pursuing the acquisition of an LHD ship by 2008.189 In addition, it 
participates in the multinational A400M project and plans to procure a total of 36 aircraft 
by 2008.190  
Furthermore, the lessons learned in Operation Artemis in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) influenced the decision taken by the EU defense ministers in 
Brussels on 17 May 2004 to proceed to the creation of nine battlegroups of 1,500 troops 
each, ready to deploy within 15 days, by 2007.191 These units, trained to fight in any kind 
of warfare (e.g., urban, mountain, jungle, desert, and amphibious operations) would 
include the “appropriate supporting elements (Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service 
Support (CSS)) together with [the] necessary strategic lift, sustainability, and 
debarkation…capability.”192 In addition, they could undertake operations within the 
whole spectrum of the existing and updated Petersberg tasks, either alone or as the initial-
entry forces of larger packages, depending on the requirements of the contingency.193  
Moreover, the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) 
decided on 17 November 2003 to develop a new Headline Goal for 2010 and directed the 
Political and Security Committee (PSC) to initiate proposals in this regard.194 The new 
operational objective will have to take stock of the December 2003 European Security 
Strategy (ESS), of the enlargement of the European Union, of the outcome of the 
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191 ISN Security Watch, EU Ministers Approve Battle Goup Plan, 18 May 2004, Available 
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menu=3], Accessed 18 May 2004.  
192 U.K./France/Germany Food for Thought Paper, The Battlegroups Concept-Capabilities 
Development in Support of EU Rapid Response, Brussels, 10 February 2004, Par. 5, 2, Available at 
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193 Ibid., 3. 
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European Security and Defence Policy, in Misiroli, ed., Par. 20, 260.  
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Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), and the experience gained from the first EU-led 
operations. The European Council held in Brussels on 12 December 2003 adopted the 
idea for the 2010 Headline Goal, and declared that “the EU needs now to look beyond 
2003, in addition to the outstanding capability shortfalls against the Helsinki Headline 
Goal that still are to be addressed, and set new goals for the further development of 
European capabilities for crisis management with a horizon of 2010, thus defining the EU 
level of ambition in terms of achieving qualitative and quantitative capability goals.”195 
Finally, the informal meeting of the EU defense ministers, held in Brussels on 17 May 
2004, decided that the qualitative requirements of the new goal would include “An 
aircraft carrier with associated air and naval escort; An EU airlift command to deploy 
troops in hotspots; A revamped communications network including space-based systems; 
[and] A planning cell in Brussels for EU military operations.”196  
In conclusion, the EU member states seem willing to take some promising 
steps to improve their overall military posture and create a credible organization, able to 
confront the 21st century’s threats. The coming years will show whether these efforts will 
bear fruit or remain unfulfilled aspirations. 
 
                                                 
195 European Council, Brussels, 12 December 2003, ESDP Presidency Report, in Misiroli, Ch. II, Par. 
7, 301.   
196 BBC News, EU Backs Elite Battle Group Plan, 17 May 2004, Available at 
[http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3722655.stm], Accessed 18 May 2004.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
Since the December 1998 Franco-British initiative at St. Malο, many steps have 
been taken by the EU member states, focusing mainly on structural and institutional 
modifications, in an effort to accelerate the ESDP process and enable the European Union 
to play a more active and influential role in international affairs. The European 
Constitution’s proposed additions to the Petersberg tasks represent a new chapter in the 
endeavor. 
The specific reference in the draft treaty of the Constitution for the European 
Union to peacetime activities, post-conflict stabilization, and support to third countries in 
combating terrorism reveals the willingness of the European Union to address the 21st 
century’s challenges. With conflict prevention capabilities, joint disarmament assets and 
military advice and assistance, the European Union would be able to play a more active 
role in international disputes, coupling its diplomatic efforts and economic prowess with 
the necessary military capabilities. The EU’s further involvement in post-conflict 
stabilization missions has been necessitated by the evolution of traditional peacekeeping 
and the further development of peace operations during the 1990s, which call for long-
term approaches rather than short-term engagements in post-conflict environments. 
Finally, the support in combating terrorism aims to confront the post-11 September 2001 
threats, which extend beyond the original crisis management provisions of the Petersberg 
tasks. 
The European Union has already undertaken various initiatives within the scope 
of most of the proposed new missions, and it has proved that it will not face significant 
problems in the employment of civilian or medium-level military personnel and 
hardware. If, however, operations require more advanced military forces and equipment, 
the European Union’s capabilities are still in an embryonic stage. Despite the progress 
achieved in recent years, the EU’s current aspirations would be limited to the conduct of 
low-risk missions. Some of the EU member states evidently regard this as an 
embarrassing situation and seem determined to change it. If it intends to gain 
international credibility, the European Union will have to acquire military assets capable 
of responding to global insecurity risks. 
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The provision for a European Armaments, Research and Military Capabilities 
Agency is the first proof of the European Union’s unwillingness to remain a “soft” 
power, in the post-11 September 2001 era, limited to low-end peacekeeping missions. In 
addition, the recent decisions about the creation by 2007 of nine combat-ready and 
rapidly deployable joint battle groups, as well as the various EU member states’ 
individual or joint procurement efforts are regarded as promising steps. Moreover, the 
establishment of a new Headline Goal for 2010, focused on specific quantitative and 
qualitative requirements, may help to provide the EU countries with the necessary 
instruments to promote the goals of the European Security Strategy. 
The suggestions for updating the Petersberg Tasks comprise only one aspect of 
the proposed Constitution’s provisions about the future development of ESDP; and it has 
been received fairly positively by all member states. Two related proposals, however, the 
prospective “structured cooperation” among some EU member states197 and a “mutual 
defense” clause calling for solidarity in case of an external attack,198 have become the 
sources of deep disagreements among EU partners and have exacerbated the discord in 
the EU-U.S. relationship caused by the divisions over the Iraq issue. In addition, a 
proposal for the establishment of a purely EU operational headquarters, at Tervuren, a 
suburb of Brussels,199 was also seen as a challenge to the cohesion of the transatlantic 
relationship. Despite the fact that some of these issues await the completion of the 
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) deliberations to be officially resolved, the 
compromises achieved among EU and NATO officials show that inter-allied unity has 
been restored. 
Facing the challenges of the third millennium, the European Union has a moral 
and political obligation to intervene in international security affairs and become a serious 
partner for NATO, the OSCE and the United Nations. The European Security Strategy 
(ESS) has placed cooperation between the European Union and these organizations at the 
heart of efforts to counter international threats. To that end, the pursuit of the updated 
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Petersberg tasks would promote multinational cooperation for the maintenance of global 
peace and prosperity and help the European Union realize some of its political 
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